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Abstract: The service sector is characterised by being over-proportionally 
based on SMEs where these SMEs rarely possess formal intellectual property 
(IPR) in the sense of patents, etc. Organisations compete intensively and reap 
relatively short-term Schumpeterian profits by means of incremental 
innovation. In this high-churn environment, managing internal knowledge 
networks for ‘mutual inspiration’ can give rise to significant competitive 
advantages; however estimates as to how to lever and encourage knowledge 
assets, and how large benefits are, are very vague. A 3D quantitative fold is 
presented called Knowledge Valley that allows for a novel knowledge-based 
theory of the evolution of SMEs and the growth of their knowledge assets. By 
using concrete values of employee number and annual turnover the model 
allows largely quantitative estimations of potential knowledge value in 
organisations and is furthermore amenable to Monte Carlo modelling, which 
explains from a knowledge assets viewpoint why the management crises in 
growing SMEs occur. 
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1 Introduction 
SMEs are well known as the drivers of employment. For example, Gregory (2003) 
reported that in the 20 years up to 1983, SMEs created more that 78% of all net new jobs 
in Canada and that small businesses (fewer than 50 employees) alone account for 42.5% 
(6.7 million jobs) of total Canadian employment. Today, many of these new small firms 
are involved in IT, internet and e-commerce. Increasingly their competitive advantage is 
driven by differentiation, their ability to provide unique and superior value in terms of 
quality, services, and special features or after sales service etc (Porter, 1990). However 
there is no simplistic answer to the process of development in small companies, and 
Smallbone and co-authors (1995) pointed out “development is much more a process of 
slow incremental iterative adaptation to emerging situations…” Indeed one of the hot 
questions in small business research is how ‘mice’ may apparently randomly quickly turn 
into ‘gazelles’. The answer may lie in their ability (or chance) to shift from using creative 
knowledge or innovation in the starting phase, to levering knowledge assets to provide 
continued innovation to fuel their growth. This is particularly relevant in the light of 
Hannon and Athertons (1998) findings that there is “no clear consensus that plans and 
planning, particularly as a formal activity, have a positive impact on small firm’s 
performance”. In the context of innovation, Ricardian (scarcity) rents may reflect 
difficulty in expanding competencies. This is the case where e.g. knowledge underpins a 
competitive advantage. One example is that in the years 1994 to 1999 knowledge of the 
internet and its function was a scarce resource, and thus companies in possession of this 
knowledge asset had a Ricardian advantage, whilst those without, were at a disadvantage 
(Porter, 2001). This means that knowledge assets, innovation and flexibility were the 
main factors in any companies’ ability to e.g. develop a functioning internet sales channel 
(i.e., Ricardian and Schumpeterian factors can work together). In the SME segment 
additional income can traditionally be attributed to Schumpeterian (entrepreneurial) 
factors because imitation does not occur instantaneously. This is because SMEs typically 
do not have resources to constantly monitor their competitors, so innovations spread by 
e.g. the rotation or replacement of staff within a branch, and is hindered by the general 
difficulty in imitating knowledge assets. Thus there is a period of temporary excess 
returns when the innovating SME may develop products and or business routines 
(knowledge assets) but competitors eventually imitate these (Meade, 1984). The SME 
area has a reputation for being a chaotic area, with many bankruptcies amongst under-
financed companies in a highly Darwinistic environment. In general SMEs have: 
• high mortality rates 
• equity/debt ratio and costly access to sources of finance 
• weak market orientation due to lack of specialised expertise 
• low productivity leading to high unit labour costs. 
Mortality rates are often measured as VAT de-registrations: Certainly in most EU 
countries there are not great differences in these figures for SMEs, at the most 20%, 
between new VAT registrations and VAT de-registrations. This is often taken as meaning 
a large churn in the SME population across Europe. However a VAT deregistration may 
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not at mean a business failure, for example business takeovers (where the company  
being sold deregisters) are a success, as are various other scenarios; the owner reaching 
retirement age and selling, the owner having achieved another target and going  
into voluntary liquidation, are success stories, but are often mistakenly classified as 
failures 
Michael Porter introduced the concept that growth needs ‘relentless innovation’  
(see Porter and Martin 2000), and that the type of innovation powering a growing SME 
shifts from creative innovation (perhaps supported by small amounts of invention) to 
innovation powered by incremental ‘inspiration’. This shift may sometimes occur in 
parallel to the shift from product innovation to process innovation as described by 
Utterback (1994). This shift can already be visible at a company size of 50–100 
employees (Mellor, 2005). Thus the type of management needed, shifts character and 
new management ideas and styles are needed. Jennings and Beaver (1997) found that 
management processes in small companies “bear little or no resemblance to management 
processes found in larger firms” and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI, 1995) 
highlights that companies who do not have the correct management expertise and who do 
not build a strong management structure, fail to achieve their targets and growth. This has 
led to many laudable efforts in introducing SME owners to management education, but 
still Storey and Westhead (1997) remark that there is “little evidence that management 
training programmes … led to better performance amongst SMEs”, which may indicate 
that insufficient emphasis is being put on leadership, including the management of 
knowledge assets and pathways, including the deployment of ‘knowledge hunters’ (those 
who go within the organisation ask questions and uncover latent ideas and potential) and 
‘knowledge gatherers’ (those who are aware of need and fill the knowledge gaps from 
internal and external sources) perhaps combined with the deployment of change agents. 
There have been attempts to model the spread of innovations, the most noticeable 
being that of Rogers (2003) ‘diffusion of Innovations’ model. However in the intervening 
years much progress in the use of mathematical modelling has been made. The idea of a 
3D model landscape is not new; In the NK model Kauffman (1993) uses ideas of a 
‘fitness landscape’ in evolutionary biology, moving agents across a ‘fitness valleys’ to 
higher ‘fitness peaks’. At higher points in the landscape, survival is more likely and the 
risk of extinction reduced. In his model Kauffman extends the NK fitness landscape to 
coupled landscapes in which a move by one species deforms the fitness of other linked 
species in the ecosystem, i.e., the species co-evolve. This type of modelling has also more 
recently become popular with business analysts applying it to anything from  
situated learning theory (Yuan and McKelvey, 2004) to manufacturing strategies  
(McCarthy, 2008). 
Knowledge management in this sector is particularly important because SMEs rarely 
possess formal intellectual property (IPR) in the sense of patents etc, but they rather 
compete intensively and reap short-term Schumpeterian profits by means of incremental 
innovation. In this high-churn environment managing internal knowledge networks for 
employee ‘mutual inspiration’ can give rise to significant albeit transient competitive 
advantage (Mellor, 2011). 
This contribution thus documents an attempt that was made to construct a 3D model 
landscape reflecting a knowledge-based view of SME evolution, using quantitative axes 
including number of employees, annual turnover and branch-specific benchmarked 
innovation practice (Mellor, 2011). 
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2 Results 
In order to emulate the ‘ties’ model of Granovetter (1973) a peer-to-peer model was 
constructed where people in an organisation are represented as nodes (the number of 
people is represented by the number P), and they are joined by ties. The number of links 
or ties between nodes is called the diversity innovation (DI) number because it represents 
the concept of diverseness between the ideas, background and education of the two 
people. As the DI number increases the potential for innovation and ‘mutual inspiration’ 
increases. In this first simple model, the main assumptions are that: 
1 a person can have a very large number of ties and that there is no upper limit 
2 all ties are exactly similar and have the same ‘weight’, quality and importance 
independent of their length 
3 each person (employee) has a direct and relatively immediate relationship to the 
short term overall financial performance of the organisation. 
The above assumptions are clearly more relevant to SMEs than larger organisations 
because: 
While individuals clearly have a saturation limit for the number of social ties they can 
enter into, at least an SME environment will be small enough not to completely overload 
them. By the same token the informal environments of SMEs, both vertically and 
horizontally, will tend to equalise the strength of ties; even though Granovetter (1973) 
shows that weak ties are disproportionally more important. Finally SMEs are more ‘lean’ 
in that few employees will not be involved in making or directly supporting mercantile 
activities. This is certainly more so in SME environments than in large companies where 
highly salaried staff like strategists or research scientists will be responsible for 
significant pools of outlay that will not be returnable in the short term (e.g., annual) 
accounts. 
When two individuals enter into a communicative relationship, then a communication 
pathway (sometimes called a link or ‘tie’) opens, i.e., in KVT terms, the DI number 
reaches 1. As long as the number of people involved is larger than 3, then the number of 
pathways is related to the number of people involved and this relationship can be 
expressed by a simple equation (note that * is the mathematical symbol for multiply): 
Figure 1 (a) The DI equation with one large department (b) The DI equation for two 
departments, D1 and D2, where pd1 represents the number of employees in department 
D1 and PD2 the number of employees in department 2 
DI  = P * [P-1] 
              -------- 
         2  
(a) 
DI = [PD1*(PD1-1)] * D + [PD2*(PD2-1)] 
          ---           --- 
           2                                 2  
(b) 
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Thus the DI number is not the amount of knowledge in an organisation and not the 
amount of innovation – it merely represents the potential for the type of small-scale, 
incremental innovations that are thought of as being important in small companies. Using 
the equation from Figure 1 the amount of potential DI in an organisation as it grows and 
acquires more employees can be seen in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Growth of DI with number of employees from 0 to 250 (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 3 DI number (subjected to a smoothing algorithm) in a population between 1 and 250 
nodes (employees), splitting the organisation into equally-sized parts when each dept 
reaches size 60 (see online version for colours) 
 
Note: Please note that this model assumes that knowledge transmission through 
information gatekeepers (nominally heads of the departments) functions perfectly. 
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However rampant knowledge sharing, and consequent recombination of knowledge, the 
fine polishing of processes through organisational learning, etc, into useful innovation, is 
prevented by the increasing transaction costs for communication: From the DI equation 
we can see that in a company with a little over 100 employees, it would take 
approximately 600 hours or 16 man-weeks of working time just for the employees to talk 
to each other for 5 minutes, excluding that any employees got a chance to repeat any 
conversations or indeed to do any work. Imagine the effect of this on SME financial 
performance. Each further employee hired would take around 10 man-hours to talk to 
existing employees for 5 minutes each. Thus at around 50 employees, transaction costs 
will simply force all organisations, including SMEs, into a policy of departmentalisation. 
Unfortunately, as shown in equation in Figure 1B, the effect of forming departments is to 
decimate the DI number (as shown in Figure 3). 
Figure 3 shows the effect of bilateral fission of departments on the DI number as the 
organisation grows from 1 to 249 employees. The curve has been subjected to a 
smoothing algorithm because mutual contact between separated individuals will be 
retained for some time, although this will fade, as well as being diluted by new arrivals 
and staff turnover. That apart, it should be also noted that other possibilities exist, namely 
the uneven splitting of the workforce. Table 1 shows the effect on the DI number of 
taking an organisation of 60 employees (an organisation of 60 employees having a 
theoretical DI number of 1770) and forming 
a six departments of 10 
b three departments of 20 
c an unequal split of 50 and 10. 
Clearly, when the transaction costs of communication become so large as to precipitate 
dividing the organisation on departmental lines, then those interested in retaining a DI 
number that is as high as possible will simply split the company into two uneven 
departments and feed new employees in the smaller part, or at least split the organisation 
into as few as possible departments. 
Table 1 The effects on DI number of splitting a company of 60 employees into departments of 
different sizes 
 Six depts. of 10 Three depts. of 20 One dept. of 50 and 1 of 10 
DI number 275 572 1,271 
Having established some key values on the X axis (employee number) and Y-axis 
(financial performance, as in one of several possible linked indicators like average 
employee salary or annual financial returns like turnover), the units on the Z-axis can be 
established. At first this looks unlikely, because there are simply no units for innovation 
(‘kiloinnos’ etc), however a 1–100% scale can be used where the value is the amount 
derived from the maximum (100%) possible using for an organisation of known size 
from the DI equation. 
The third dimension of the model is given by a J-curve or ‘hockey stick’ curve, 
because the J-curve represents a transition where – put simply – things get worse before 
they get better. Imagine a farmer who saves up for a more powerful combine harvester; 
whilst saving, his standard of living (available cash) drops until such time as the purchase 
can be accomplished, whereupon increased efficiency will drive his standard of living up 
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again, to a level presumably higher than the original level. Many examples of this “it gets 
worse before it gets better” effect are known from several disciplines, e.g. medicine, the 
investment in a new venture and this type of curve is also widely used in economics to 
describe, e.g., devaluation (or depreciation) due to low price elasticity following changes 
in international exchange rates (i.e., a transient worsening in the national balance of 
payments due to inelastic demand for imports and exports). In the KVT model values on 
the Z-axis are derived from business process reengineering (BPR) literature. This means 
that an organisation that can be benchmarked against others in the same industry sector as 
having a very small degree of openness to innovation could undergo a theoretical BPR 
process and after initially decreasing in value (sallies, turnover, profit or other metric) 
progress along the BPR ‘hockey stick’ curve up to a level of profitability that is higher 
than at the origin. At this point the benchmarked degree of openness to innovation will 
also have increased. This is the kind of J-curve recently used by Bremmer (2006) to 
describe the stability and standard of living of nation-states (on the y-axis) with ‘degree 
of openness’ (on the x-axis). Bremmer used the J-curve not only to illustrate differences 
in national government, but interestingly, to encourage the concept of manageable change 
before the country in question breaks apart. 
Estimating the position of organisations on the z-axis is semi-quantitative because 
values of zero and 100% will hardly be possible. However practitioners can  
semi-quantitatively measure the actual DI number in an organisation and compare it with 
the theoretical figure from the equations given in Figure 1; i.e., a measured DI of 100 
plus/minus 20 in an organisation possessing a theoretical DI number of 200 is 50% 
plus/minus 10%. 
At the lowest point on the hockey stick curve the value of a commercial company 
undergoing BPR may be decreased by 40%. This means that an organisation worth  
10 million per annum (or whatever other financial metric is being used) will be down to  
6 million. This is the practical value seen and reported by BPR professionals, e.g., 
McKinsey, Accenture, Deloitte and others, but obviously it does not represent the lowest 
possible value, because there is nothing to stop the company worth 10 million from going 
down to zero, or even minus 10 million, it is just that if the value drops below the 40% 
rule of thumb, then the firm will probably not survive the BPR operation (Mellor, 2011). 
Similarly we can estimate the difference in height of the starting and finishing points; 
always subject to the difficulties in measuring innovation value as mentioned above. 
Taking a traditional company as starting point and transforming it, a successful BPR 
project will, at maturity, approximately triple the value of an organisation (noting that 
exact figures are not possible to, e.g., the nature of accounting practices, inflation and that 
the world will have moved on). Higher values than this – reaching up to 10 – have been 
reported by, e.g., Lillrank and Holopainen (1998), but these are regarded in the industry 
as being very special cases and are much trickier to compare as they often pertain to 
newer companies, i.e., comparing internet-based companies like Amazon with a purely 
theoretical non-internet baseline. The values used in constructing the Knowledge Valley 
hockey stick curve are given in Table 2. 
Table 2, where percent use of innovation plotted against financials (either age, or 
profit or turnover), results in the hockey stick curve shown in Figure 4. This curve also 
represents the expected curve of a BPR operation taking a low-innovation organisation 
from the left to a higher state on the right, high-value organisations on the right of the 
curve shown in Figure 4 representing those exhibiting a higher degree of openness to 
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innovation and thus being better able to use Schumpeterian innovation to create more 
and/or superior value. 
Table 2 An overview of the data used in preparing Figure 4 and Figure 5 
Percent use of 
innovation Average wage 
Profit per 
employee 
Income per 
worker 
Minimum annual 
turnover 
0 20,000 13,014 33,014 8,253,500 
10 20,000 11,447 31,447 7,861,750 
20 20,000 9,640 29,640 7,410,000 
30 18,000 8,194 26,194 6,548,500 
40 19,000 7,240 26,240 6,560,000 
50 20,000 9,399 29,399 7,349,750 
60 21,000 14,460 35,460 8,865,000 
70 25,000 20,485 45,485 11,371,250 
80 30,000 26,510 56,510 14,127,500 
90 35,000 33,740 68,740 17,185,000 
100 40,000 40,006 80,006 20,001,500 
Note: Financial values in British pounds as of 2008. 
Figure 4 The j-curve as derived from Table 2 
 
In order to create the 3D fold called Knowledge Valley, the curve shown in Figure 3 
representing increase in DI number with increase in employee number and increase in 
number of departments is combined with the hockey stick curve represented in Figure 4. 
Using Maple software this results in the 3D fold shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 The fold of knowledge valley, made up of Figure 3 and a BPR J-curve of Figure 4  
(see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 5 shows the growth of an organisation from new venture formation to size 249 
employees (i.e., the border f being an SME under the conventional definition). Figure 5 
also shows that during this time the value of the organisation increases concomitantly 
with employee number and can be measured by several interrelated metrics. Using this 
fold it can be seen that the first round of departmentalisation – assuming equal  
fission – cuts deeply into profitability. Practitioners may use this as an argument to divide 
the workforce unevenly in order to conserve DI number (see Table 1). Figure 5 shows 
also that the second round of departmentalisation (again, assuming equal fission) cuts 
very deeply into profitability and indeed endangers the very life of the organisation. In 
this situation organisations making 30% viability (measured in the metrics being used, 
e.g., mark up, profit, dividends, salary floatation etc) will be knocked into the red  
(i.e., negative) by 10% or more. KVT implies that this is indeed the most dangerous stage 
in the growth of an SME. 
3 Discussion 
Clearly almost all companies start small and of these, some grow larger. Models of small 
business development describe a hypothetical trajectory for the evolution of an SME 
through its lifetime; however their developmental trajectories will be relatively unique. 
Most new ventures fail. Those that survive will clearly have some kind of viable 
mercantile activity plus the ability to successfully persist and perhaps even grow, in a 
rapidly changing marketplace. 
There are several developmental models of company growth; the most often cited are 
Greiner (1972) and Churchill and Lewis (1983), as well as Garnsey (1996). These and 
others are adequately reviewed in the standard literature (e.g., Kirby, 2003; Mellor, 
2003). The static stage/age model of small business development as presented by Greiner 
(1972) describes five stages of relatively calm ‘evolution’ where the transition to the 
subsequent stage is characterised by a chaotic ‘revolution’. Greiner’s stages are: 
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Table 3 The Greiner (1972) model stages as applied to growth-oriented companies 
Greiner 
stage 
Characteristics of the 
evolutionary stage 
Followed by 
revolution 
 
1 Creativity Crisis of leadership Moving from purely entrepreneurial 
drive to leadership that has different 
specialist knowledge 
2 Direction Crisis of autonomy Line staff needs to decide between 
procedures and initiative. 
3 Delegation Crisis of control Lower and middle managers are 
perceived to have excess power and 
there is little cross-talk between 
divisions 
4 Coordination Crisis of red tape Senior management has adopted a 
watchdog approach 
5 Collaboration Crisis of 
psychological 
saturation 
Shift to interpersonal collaboration to 
get employees to work together 
through a sense of mission or purpose. 
Notes: Please note that if success at crisis stage 5 (i.e. renewal) is not chosen then further 
options include divestment or break-up into a group of smaller enterprises. Please 
note furthermore that by stage 4 or 5 the organisation may be larger than an SME. 
The weakness with the Greiner (1972) and other models is that it correlates the 
developmental age (in terms of place in the cycle) of a company with its size, but 
unfortunately it does not specify any units. Furthermore Greiner (1972) does not take 
knowledge flow and redundancy into account, which should be created by overlapping 
information sources, business activities and managerial responsibilities combined with 
learning, indeed Nonaka (1991) argues that redundancy is critical because it encourages 
higher levels of dialogue and communication, thus ensuring the exchange of tacit 
knowledge. This may reflect the ‘low productivity’ found in SMEs. However in fact this 
parallels the comments of Burns and Whitehouse (2005) about innovation in corporations 
“Innovation requires organisational ‘slack’ or ‘space’ a looseness in resource 
availability which allows employees to ‘borrow’ expertise…”. 
Thus by using the predictions implicit in knowledge valley theory (KVT), one can for 
the first time provisionally calibrate the Greiner (1972) model: From Figure 5 we can see 
that the first crisis point comes with the first fission into departments. At this time a 
typical scenario may be that the organisation has become the size to start incurring 
significant transaction costs for communication, thus taxing the original entrepreneur 
excessively such that more leadership is brought in. This corresponds well with Greiner 
description “Moving from purely entrepreneurial drive, to leadership that has different 
specialist knowledge” (Greiner, 1972) although the majority of SMEs, not being growth 
oriented, may suffice with bringing in trusted friends or family. Indeed several studies 
including the adoption of IT innovation in European SMEs (Mellor, 2005), studies of 
SMEs in the aerospace industry (McLean and Mellor, 2006) and of 400 SMEs in various 
trades in South West London (Barnes et al., 2007) all point to the trust factor being  
over-proportionally more important in small companies as opposed to large corporations. 
However as the company grows to maturity beyond the 50+ employees stage the 
structure will inevitably become more hierarchical and ossified, possibly strangling the 
leverage of knowledge assets. So again, it may seem like a period of calm when the 
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enterprise is growing over 60–70 employees, however Figure 5 shows that the next round 
of departmentalisation may cut the value of the company right back to the bottom of the 
J-curve. Thus companies aiming to follow a high-risk, high-gain strategy should be 
equipped for a potentially disastrous transition at around size 90–110 employees. At this 
time the new middle management needs to be more professional than may be found in 
family members, even the losses indicated in Figure 5 assume that knowledge 
transmission through information gatekeepers (nominally heads of the departments) 
functions perfectly, certainly imperfect information gate-keeping can be expected to 
make the situation worse. Clearly at size 110–250 employees the stage “lower and middle 
managers are perceived to have excess power and there is little cross-talk between 
divisions” (Greiner, 1972) appears to reflect the large strain being placed on information 
gatekeepers as implied by the KVT model (see Figure 5). 
4 Conclusions 
The 3D fold called Knowledge Valley presents a novel knowledge-based view of SME 
development by using calibrated axes of qualitative values, resulting in a 3D landscape 
representing the innovation potential in an organisation. This is not stockpiled knowledge 
but rather the potential for the recombination of ideas, for learning and for ‘mutual 
inspiration’ within an organisation for entrepreneurial ends. Gratifyingly, this theory, 
called KVT, appears not only to match classical models of small business development 
but also is able to explain the classical views of SME development - as obtained by actual 
field studies - from a new perspective; that of knowledge mapping and knowledge 
management. 
The significant step with KVT is that by attaching concrete values to growth stages, 
KVT may have many practical uses. It can be used as a map for practitioners and SME 
owners to navigate their way, whether they wish to chart a course for calm waters, for 
improved performance and growth, or indeed should they, like many SME owners, do not 
wish to progress further, these strategies are referred to as ‘capped growth’ or similar (for 
a convenient review, see McMahon, 1998) and may simply reflect that the owners 
lifestyle is satisfied, or a reluctance on part of the owner to take on external investors to 
finance further growth, or other factors. 
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